Showing posts with label Market Failure. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Market Failure. Show all posts

School Device Mandates: A Case Study in Market Failure

Could a school compelling students to buy a particular device at a prearranged price from a specific company be an example of market failure?

Short answer:  Yes — a school compelling families to buy a specific device, at a fixed price, from a single approved supplier can be analysed as a form of market failure, depending on which strand of the theory you apply.

🎯 Core takeaway

A compulsory, single‑supplier device scheme can exhibit monopoly power, asymmetric information, and distorted incentives — all recognised forms of market failure in Leaving Cert Economics.

🧩 1. Monopoly Power (Partial Market Failure)

When a school mandates one specific device from one specific company, it effectively creates a captive market.

- Families cannot choose cheaper alternatives.  

- The supplier faces no competitive pressure to lower prices.  

- The price may be higher than the socially efficient level.

This aligns directly with monopoly power as a cause of market failure.

🧩 2. Asymmetric Information

Parents often cannot judge:

- whether the device is necessary,  

- whether the price is fair,  

- whether cheaper substitutes would work just as well.

The school and the EdTech company hold more information than families.  

This is classic asymmetric information leading to sub‑optimal outcomes.

🧩 3. Externalities (Negative)

A compulsory device scheme can impose unintended costs on families and society:

- financial strain on households,  

- increased digital distraction,  

- e‑waste and environmental costs.

These are negative externalities not reflected in the €600 price.

🧩 4. Government / Institutional Failure

If the school (or Department) creates a policy that:

- restricts competition,  

- increases costs for families,  

- benefits a small number of suppliers,

…this can be framed as government failure — another recognised cause of market failure.

🧩 5. Missing Market for Alternatives

If students are not allowed to bring their own device (BYOD), even when cheaper or already owned, then the market for alternatives is effectively blocked.

This resembles a missing market created by policy rather than by nature.

🧩 So is it market failure?

Economically, yes — you can argue that:

> A compulsory, single‑supplier device scheme restricts competition, limits consumer choice, and leads to inefficient allocation of resources.

That is the textbook definition of partial market failure.

Ireland’s Immigration Crisis

(A podcast on this article is available here).

1️⃣ The “Failure Premium”

Ireland’s immigration challenges are not caused by immigrants, but by the absence of state institutions capable of managing large‑scale arrivals.

> “There was no plan that failed, simply because there was no plan at all.”

The result: high costs, human suffering, and political backlash.


2️⃣ Ireland’s Structural Weaknesses (Pre‑Influx)

Ireland entered the migration surge with:

- Lowest housing stock per capita in Western Europe  

- Rents up 98% in a decade  

- 43% fewer hospital beds than EU average  

- GP lists closed in 75% of practices  

- Minimal public transport outside Dublin  

- Institutional capacity built for 3.6m people, not 5m

This meant zero spare capacity before immigration increased.


3️⃣ Scale of Immigration (2021–2024)

- 500,000+ arrivals in a few years  

- Three consecutive years of 100,000+ arrivals  

- Highest per‑capita intake in the EU  

- 23% of population foreign‑born  

- 75% of population growth from immigration

Ireland had no integration system to absorb this.


4️⃣ A Two‑Tier System Emerges

Ukrainian Refugees

- Immediate right to work  

- Medical cards, welfare, school places  

- €800/month host payment  

- Ireland went 3× beyond EU minimum

Asylum Seekers (Africa, Middle East, Asia)

- €38.80/week  

- 6‑month work ban  

- Years in hotel rooms  

- 70% rejection rate  

- Some forced to sleep rough (2023)


5️⃣ Cruelty in Every Direction

To Immigrants

- Warehoused in hotels at €99/night  

- No language classes, mental health supports, or integration  

- Ukrainians integrated into schools, then told to find housing in a <1% vacancy market

To Local Communities

- No GP expansion  

- No school places added  

- Hotels removed from tourism economies  

- Housing competition intensified  

- Communities blamed as “racist” for raising legitimate capacity concerns

> “You cannot get ‘something’ from ‘nothing’.”


6️⃣ Political Avoidance & Gaslighting

- Government celebrated generosity in Brussels  

- Built no permanent accommodation  

- Outsourced everything to private hotels  

- Now reversing course and blaming communities

The article argues this is not moral leadership, but performative politics.


7️⃣ The Middle Class Will Soon Feel It

The EU–India Free Trade Agreement (2026) will ease movement for skilled Indian workers across the EU.

Implications for Ireland:

- More competition for housing  

- Pressure on wages in tech & professional sectors  

- Increased demand for crèches, GPs, and transport  

- Middle class will enter the same zero‑sum competition as working‑class communities


8️⃣ Final Takeaway

Ireland’s immigration crisis is fundamentally a state capacity crisis.


> “A state that builds institutions absorbs the cost once. Ireland never built them… and everyone will pay the price.”


The article argues that immigration can be a net positive, but only when supported by institutions, planning, and integration systems—all of which Ireland failed to build.

Energy Poverty and Affordability in Ireland

1. Overview and Context

Energy poverty refers to a household’s inability to access essential energy services (heating, lighting, electricity) at an affordable cost. It is not just about high bills—it also includes under-consumption of energy due to financial constraints, which can harm health and wellbeing.

The issue is becoming more important due to:

  • Rising energy price volatility
  • Climate transition costs
  • Geopolitical instability
  • Structural inequalities in income and housing

The report emphasises that energy poverty is multidimensional, shaped by:

  • Income levels
  • Energy prices
  • Housing quality and energy efficiency
  • Broader socio-economic inequalities

It is therefore both an economic and social justice issue.

2. Scale of Energy Poverty in Ireland

  • Around 14% of households self-reported energy poverty in 2024
  • Using broader measures, over 30% of households experience some form of energy affordability issue
  • In 2015, ~600,000 households (over one-third) met at least one energy poverty criterion

➡️ Key point:
The scale varies dramatically depending on how you measure it.

3. Measurement: Why It Matters

Ireland’s official measure:

  • HSEEI-10% → households spending >10% of income on energy

Problems with this measure:

  • Data only collected every 5 years
  • Misses households that under-consume energy (hidden poverty)
  • Underestimates the true scale

Alternative measures:

  1. Self-reported indicators
    • Inability to afford adequate warmth (IAAW)
    • Arrears on utility bills (AUB)
    • Available annually → useful for short-term monitoring
  2. Expenditure-based indicators
    • High energy share, low income–high cost, low expenditure, etc.
    • Better for structural analysis
  3. Union Indicators (combined measures)
    • Count households meeting any criterion
    • Provide the most realistic estimate of overall energy hardship

➡️ Conclusion:
No single indicator is sufficient. A multi-indicator system is essential.

4. Multidimensional Nature of Energy Poverty

Different indicators capture different groups:

  • Some households:
    • Spend too much on energy
  • Others:
    • Spend too little (due to deprivation)
  • Others:
    • Report hardship but don’t show high expenditure

➡️ Result:

  • Limited overlap between indicators
  • Each measure reveals a different “slice” of the problem

Union indicators show:

  • Energy poverty is far more widespread than any single measure suggests

5. Vulnerable Groups (Who Is Most at Risk?)

The report identifies consistent high-risk profiles:

Most vulnerable:

  • Low-income households
  • Renters (especially private sector)
  • Single-parent households
  • Unemployed individuals
  • Households with poor health or disability
  • Rural households
  • People in older, inefficient housing

Additional patterns:

  • Female-headed households face higher risk
  • Younger households rely more on supports
  • Vulnerabilities often overlap and reinforce each other

➡️ Key insight:
Energy poverty is clustered disadvantage, not isolated hardship.

6. Affordability Risk Framework

The report proposes a framework based on three factors:

  • Income level
  • Energy costs
  • Share of income spent on energy

Households are mapped into risk zones, identifying:

  • Current energy poverty
  • Future vulnerability (important for climate transition)

Structural vulnerability is defined as:

  • Income poverty plus additional risk factors (e.g. renting + single parenthood)

7. Severity: The Energy Poverty Gap

A major contribution of the report is estimating how severe energy poverty is.

Findings:

  • Households need:
    • €11–€45 per week to escape energy poverty
  • Average annual gap:
    • ~€480 per household

Policy implication:

  • Closing the gap for all vulnerable households would cost:
    • ~€370 million

Compare:

  • Universal electricity credit (2024): €550–575 million

➡️ Conclusion:
Targeted supports could achieve the same outcome at ~40% lower cost.

8. Structural Drivers

The main drivers of energy poverty are:

1. Income (most important factor)

  • Low disposable income = highest risk

2. Housing conditions

  • Poor insulation
  • Old buildings
  • Energy inefficiency

3. Broader cost pressures

  • Rent
  • Healthcare costs
  • Household composition

4. Energy prices

  • Short-term shocks can rapidly worsen affordability

Key finding:

  • Rising incomes in recent years helped offset:
    • Higher energy prices
    • Cost-of-living pressures

9. Policy Recommendations

A. Measurement Reform

Adopt a multi-indicator monitoring system, including:

  • IAAW (short-term shocks)
  • HSEEI-2M (structural burden)
  • LAEE (hidden deprivation)

B. Short-Term Policies

Use responsive tools during shocks:

  • Targeted energy credits
  • Bill supports
  • Deferred payment schemes
  • Emergency protections

⚠️ Must be targeted, not universal.

C. Long-Term Policies

Address structural causes:

  • Home retrofitting
  • Energy efficiency upgrades
  • Clean energy investment
  • Income supports

D. Better Targeting

Align energy policy with:

  • Social protection system
  • Welfare payments
  • Housing policy

10. Welfare and Energy Poverty

Energy-poor households typically rely on:

  • Housing supports
  • Child-related benefits
  • Fuel allowance
  • Disability supports

Less reliance on:

  • Old-age pensions (due to younger demographic profile)

➡️ Insight:
Energy poverty is closely tied to existing welfare dependency patterns.

11. Overall Conclusions

  • Energy poverty in Ireland is widespread, complex, and underestimated
  • It is driven primarily by income inequality and structural housing issues
  • Measurement using a single indicator is inadequate
  • Targeted policies are significantly more cost-effective than universal supports
  • Addressing energy poverty requires:
    • Coordination across energy, housing, and social policy

Bottom Line (for students)

Energy poverty isn’t just about high bills—it’s about how income, housing, and energy systems interact. If policymakers measure it badly, they target it badly, and that leads to wasted spending and missed households.

The economics of the fuel-price protests

1. What is happening?

Ireland is experiencing nationwide fuel‑price protests, now entering their third and fourth days, involving blockades of fuel depots, the Whitegate refinery, major motorways, and central Dublin. Protesters include farmers, hauliers, professional drivers, and other fuel‑dependent sectors.

Key developments:

- Blockades at Whitegate refinery (Cork), Foynes (Limerick), and Galway have immobilised roughly half of Ireland’s fuel supply, including parts of the strategic emergency reserve. 

- Forecourts in Galway and elsewhere have begun running dry, despite no national shortage of fuel—only a distribution blockage. 

- Major urban disruption, especially in Dublin: O’Connell Street blockaded, Luas Green Line suspended, Dublin Bus rerouted, and the M50 repeatedly shut by convoys. 

- Panic buying has begun, with some forecourts out of petrol. 

- The Government has requested Defence Forces assistance to remove heavy vehicles blocking critical infrastructure. 

2. Why are prices so high? — The economic drivers

According to multiple reports:

- Petrol and diesel prices have reached ~€1.95 and €2.17 per litre, respectively. 

- Protesters attribute the increases to:

  - Middle East conflict disrupting supply routes (especially the Strait of Hormuz). 

  - Government taxes, including excise duty, carbon tax, and VAT.

  - A belief that government intervention has been insufficient or misdirected.

3. Protesters’ demands

Protesters are calling for:

- Cuts to excise duty (a per‑unit tax on fuel).

- Suspension or removal of carbon tax for at least six months. 

- Price caps on diesel, petrol, and kerosene. 

- Direct talks with senior government figures. 

These demands map directly onto core microeconomic concepts:

Excise duty

An excise duty is a specific tax that shifts the supply curve upward by the amount of the tax.  

Effects:

- Higher equilibrium price for consumers.

- Lower equilibrium quantity.

- Reduced consumer and producer surplus.

- Creation of deadweight loss.

Carbon tax

A carbon tax is a Pigouvian tax, intended to internalise the negative externality of emissions.  

Effects:

- Same supply‑shift mechanism as excise duty.

- But justified on social welfare grounds (reducing external costs).

- Politically contentious because the burden falls heavily on fuel‑dependent sectors.

Price caps

A cap below equilibrium price creates:

- Excess demand (shortages).

- Incentives for black markets or non‑price rationing.

- Reduced producer surplus and potential exit of suppliers.

4. Government’s conflicting aims

The Government faces a classic policy trade‑off:

A. Protect household/business incomes

High fuel prices reduce:

- Disposable income.

- Competitiveness of transport‑intensive industries.

- Rural mobility.

B. Maintain climate commitments

Carbon taxes are central to Ireland’s legally binding emissions targets.

C. Preserve public order and critical infrastructure

Blockades threaten:

- Fuel supply chains.

- Emergency services.

- Hospital access.

- Airport operations. 

D. Avoid setting a precedent

Meeting protesters’ demands directly could:

- Encourage future blockades.

- Undermine representative bodies (e.g., IFA, IRHA), which are not officially involved. 

This tension is visible in the Government’s shift from engagement to enforcement, including the request for Defence Forces assistance.

5. People power vs. state authority

The protests illustrate a classic political‑economy dynamic:

People power

- The movement is decentralised, organised largely via social media, making it difficult for the state to negotiate with a single actor. 

- Blockades have proven highly effective at creating immediate economic pressure.

Government response

- Gardaí initially used the “4Es” model: Engage, Explain, Encourage, Enforce.  

  When blockades escalated, Gardaí declared:  

  “These are no longer protests, they are blockades.” 

- The Government has described the actions as “national sabotage” (per reporting). 

- The Defence Forces have been asked to provide heavy vehicle recovery, not armed intervention. 

This escalation reflects:

- The state’s need to maintain critical infrastructure.

- The political risk of appearing out of touch or heavy‑handed.

- The delicate balance between civil liberties and economic stability.

6. How this ties into our economics course

Here are the most relevant concepts to emphasise:

A. Tax incidence

- Who actually bears the burden of excise and carbon taxes?

- Why fuel‑dependent sectors feel the impact more intensely.

B. Elasticity

- Demand for fuel is relatively inelastic, so taxes raise significant revenue but also impose large burdens.

- Supply disruptions (blockades) cause sharp price and quantity effects.

C. Surplus and deadweight loss

- Taxes reduce both consumer and producer surplus.

- Blockades create additional deadweight loss by preventing mutually beneficial transactions.

D. Externalities

- Carbon tax is designed to correct a negative externality.

- But the distributional impact can overshadow the efficiency argument.

E. Public choice theory

- Government must balance:

  - Climate goals.

  - Revenue needs.

  - Electoral incentives.

  - Pressure from organised groups.

F. Market failure vs. government failure

- High prices partly reflect global supply shocks (market failure).

- But protesters argue that government policy exacerbates the burden (government failure).

7. A final synthesis for economics students

The Irish fuel‑price protests are a live case study in how:

- Microeconomic tools (taxes, surpluses, elasticity) interact with  

- Macroeconomic shocks (global conflict),  

- Political constraints, and  

- Collective action.

They reveal the tension between:

- A government pursuing long‑term environmental and fiscal goals, and  

- A population facing immediate cost‑of‑living pressures.

The threat to deploy the Defence Forces underscores how economic grievances can escalate into institutional stress, especially when essential infrastructure is involved. 

Podcast available here.

The new tenancy laws in Ireland:

The government of Ireland has introduced significant reforms to tenancy laws that affect existing and new tenancies, primarily coming into effect from March 1, 2026. The changes aim to strengthen tenant protections while encouraging investment in the rental market. 
Key aspects of the new laws include:
Nationwide Rent Controls
  • Current Law (since June 20, 2025): The entire country has been designated a Rent Pressure Zone (RPZ), meaning rent increases for all tenancies are capped at the lower of general inflation (CPI) or 2% per year pro rata.
  • From March 1, 2026:
    • Rent increases will remain linked to inflation (CPI), capped at 2% during periods of high inflation for most tenancies.
    • Landlords can reset the rent to market value between tenancies if the previous tenant left voluntarily or breached their obligations, or at the end of each six-year tenancy period (unless a "no-fault" eviction occurred).
    • Newly built apartments (commenced after June 10, 2025) are exempt from the 2% cap; their rent increases will be tied only to the CPI. 
Enhanced Security of Tenure 
  • Existing Tenancies: Tenancies in place before March 1, 2026, will continue under the current rules, which already provide for tenancies of unlimited duration once the tenant is in occupation for 6 months without a valid termination notice.
  • New Tenancies (from March 1, 2026):
    • New tenancies will be "Tenancies of Minimum Duration" (TMD) with rolling six-year terms, providing tenants with greater stability.
    • During the six-year term, a landlord can only end the tenancy under specific, limited circumstances, such as a tenant's breach of obligations, or if the property no longer suits the tenant's needs.
    • Tenants can still end a TMD by providing the required notice.
Restrictions on "No-Fault" Evictions
The reforms introduce a distinction between landlords with varying numbers of tenancies.
  • Larger Landlords (four or more tenancies): Will effectively be banned from using "no-fault" eviction grounds (such as selling the property, major renovations, or personal/family use) except in very limited, undefined circumstances. They can still terminate for tenant breaches or unsuitability of the property.
  • Smaller Landlords (three or fewer tenancies): Will have more flexibility but are still restricted. During a six-year TMD, they can only evict for limited reasons, such as defined "hardship" (e.g., homelessness, bankruptcy, separation) or if an immediate family member needs the property. At the end of each six-year cycle, they may terminate the tenancy for reasons including selling the property, major renovations, or family use. 
The legislation to implement these changes is in the process of being prepared and will be published later in 2025. For the most up-to-date, official information, refer to the Residential Tenancies Board or the Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage websites. 

Click here to listen to a podcast on this topic.

Delivering Homes, Building Communities (2025–2030): Summary

Overview
Prepared by Ireland’s Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage, Delivering Homes, Building Communities sets out the Government’s housing strategy for 2025–2030. It aims to deliver 300,000 new homes by 2030 through a mix of public and private sector collaboration, addressing both supply and affordability challenges. The plan builds on Housing for All and represents the largest housing investment in the history of the State.

Key Objectives
  • Deliver 300,000 new homes by 2030, including 72,000 social homes and 90,000 Starter Home supports.
  • Commit €20 billion annually in development finance, with over €9 billion from State sources and the remainder from private investment.
  • Ensure a fair, sustainable housing system that promotes homeownership, affordable rents, and social inclusion.
  • Tackle vacancy, dereliction, and homelessness, while regenerating communities across urban and rural Ireland.
Core Structure
  • The plan is organised under two main pillars, each containing four priority areas.
  • Pillar 1 – Activating Supply
  • Activating Land and Infrastructure
  • Ensure a strong pipeline of zoned and serviced land.
  • Deliver key infrastructure (water, transport, energy) to make sites “shovel ready”.
  • Implement the Planning and Development Act 2024 to streamline planning and judicial review.
Facilitating Investment and Viability
  • Attract domestic and international capital for housing development.
  • Reform apartment standards and introduce tax incentives (e.g., 9% VAT rate).
  • Capitalise the Land Development Agency (LDA) and Housing Finance Agency to expand their role.
  • Launch a €1 billion Infrastructure Fund to remove delivery bottlenecks.
  • Increasing Skills and Modern Construction Methods (MMC)
  • Use Modern Methods of Construction (e.g., modular building) in at least 25% of new social and affordable housing.
  • Expand training and apprenticeships in construction.
  • Promote innovation through Enterprise Ireland’s Built to Innovate programme.
Securing Additional Supply, Ending Dereliction & Vacancy
  • Expand the Vacant Property Refurbishment Grant and Derelict Property Tax.
  • Support regeneration through the Urban Regeneration and Development Fund (URDF) and Living City Initiative.
  • Enable local authorities to use Compulsory Purchase Orders (CPOs) more efficiently.
Pillar 2 – Supporting People
Ending Homelessness and Promoting Inclusion
  • Introduce a National Homeless Prevention Framework.
  • Expand the Housing First Programme and strengthen homelessness legislation.
  • Increase housing for older people, disabled persons, and the Traveller community.
Providing More Social Homes
  • Deliver an average of 12,000 new social homes per year.
  • Streamline approval processes and standardise designs.
  • Enhance local authority delivery capacity and improve maintenance of existing housing stock.
Increasing Affordable Homeownership and Protecting Renters
  • Deliver 15,000 affordable housing supports annually through the Starter Homes Programme.
  • Extend schemes such as Help to Buy and First Home.
  • Introduce national rent controls, a rent price register, and stronger tenant protections.
  • Regulate short-term lets and expand purpose-built student accommodation.
Investing in Villages, Towns, and Cities
  • Focus on urban regeneration and compact, sustainable development.
  • Support rural housing and revitalisation through the Town Centre First initiative.
  • Fund remediation for defective concrete blocks and apartments.
  • Support the Dublin City Taskforce and An Ghaeltacht development plans.
Funding and Implementation
  • Backed by record State and private investment, including:
  • €102 billion in critical infrastructure.
  • €3.5 billion for electricity grid upgrades.
  • €12.2 billion for water services.
  • €2.5 billion additional capital for the Land Development Agency.
  • A new Housing Activation Office will coordinate national delivery.
  • The Cabinet Committee on Housing will oversee progress with measurable metrics.
Conclusion
The plan presents a comprehensive, delivery-focused framework to address Ireland’s housing shortage through large-scale construction, affordability measures, and community regeneration. It combines state-led investment, private sector participation, and modern construction innovation to achieve sustainable housing for all.

The full document is available here.
Podcast available here.

My take on the government's plan:

Ireland’s latest housing plan is impressive on paper but hopeless in practice. Delivering Homes, Building Communities promises 300,000 homes by 2030, 72,000 of them social but anyone familiar with Ireland’s housing machine knows these targets exist more for headlines than for homes.

The same problems that hobbled Housing for All remain untouched: endless planning delays, a shorthanded construction sector, and bureaucratic drift that kills urgency. Ministers can talk about “modern methods of construction” and “activation offices” all they like but rebranding inefficiency doesn’t fix it.

The funding looks vast, but much of the €275 billion figure is repackaged spending or long-term capital that won’t translate into actual roofs any time soon. Developers face higher borrowing costs, local resistance remains entrenched, and the State still can’t build quickly without tripping over its own regulations.

Ireland doesn’t lack ambition; it lacks execution. The document reads more like political theatre than a credible delivery plan heavy on verbs, light on realism. 

Unless there’s a fundamental shift in how planning, labour, and finance are coordinated, this plan will end up exactly where most of its predecessors have: filed neatly under “aspiration”.

A detailed, evidence-based account of the Irish housing market (2000 → 2025)

Ireland’s housing story since 2000 is a textbook of boom, bust, painful public rescue, a long and incomplete recovery, and then a fresh affordability crisis driven by chronic under-supply plus very large inward migration. Below I set out the timeline, the key numbers, and the supply/demand drivers with primary sources for the biggest claims so you can follow-up.

1) The boom (roughly 2000 → 2007)

House prices exploded. Average residential prices peaked in 2007 at €349,838 (CSO). This followed years of rapid credit growth, big income gains and a construction boom. 

Construction output and land rezoning ran hot: tens of thousands of homes were being completed annually in the mid-2000s (estimates often cited 70–80k starts/completions across the peak years when including spec/backlog), with large volumes of developer credit flowing into property.

Why it mattered: prices relative to incomes became extreme — the house-price-to-disposable income ratio more than doubled in the 1997→2007 run. The result was a fragile market stacked on high leverage and speculative building.

2) The crash and immediate aftermath (2007 → 2012)

Prices collapsed: After the 2007 peak average prices fell sharply to a trough of about €205,476 in 2012 — a fall on the order of 40% nationally, and much deeper in Dublin (apartment prices fell by over 60% in places). 

The banking sector imploded under property losses and wholesale funding runs: The Government introduced a broad bank guarantee in Sept 2008, nationalised Anglo Irish Bank (and later recapitalised other banks), and created the state “bad bank” (NAMA) to remove toxic property loans from bank balance sheets.

Scale of the fiscal/banking cost: The final tally of direct bank recapitalisation costs commonly cited is in the €60–€90 billion range depending on accounting — the official figure often quoted is about €62.8 billion of direct bank costs; NAMA acquired loans with nominal values in the €70–75 billion area and paid (via government guaranteed securities) far less in exchange. The Irish government also entered an EU/IMF programme in late 2010 (loans ~€67.5bn) to stabilise the sovereign position. Those interventions were massive relative to GDP and left a long public debt legacy. 

3) The long, uneven recovery (2012 → c.2013–2019)

After the trough the economy (and house prices) slowly recovered as employment returned, exports rebounded and confidence returned. Construction fell to very low post-crash levels for several years, contributing to a long “lost decade” of insufficient supply relative to demand. Many mortgage arrears remained an issue for years. 

By the mid-2010s the number of new builds remained well below pre-crash peaks; transactional activity was muted compared with earlier years.

4) Strong price recovery and the supply squeeze (2013 → 2023/24)

From the mid-2010s onward prices rose steadily and by the early 2020s had recovered and exceeded parts of the 2007 peak in many areas. Analysts repeatedly pointed to weak supply as the structural cause: not enough completions for the growing population and rising inward migration, plus loss of smaller landlords from the rental market, planning and infrastructural bottlenecks, and constrained development finance. Central Bank staff estimated that 52,000 new homes per year (or thereabouts) would be needed to meet demand over coming decades — a big step up from actual completions. 

By 2024–2025 the market was once again very tight: second-hand listings plunged, asking prices and rents rose briskly, and many commentators blamed the shortage of homes for sale and the surge in people needing housing. Daft.ie and other analysts documented very low advertised stock and notable annual price/rent increases in 2023–2025. 

5) Post-crash structural policy responses (2009 → 2015 → ongoing)

NAMA (2009/2010): set up to buy the worst development loans (nominal acquisition values ~€70–74bn; purchases at deep discounts and financed by government-guaranteed securities). Its role was to stabilise the banks and manage large development exposures off bank balance sheets. Over time NAMA sold assets and returned money to the State; it played a major role in managing the fallout from the construction bust. 

Bank recapitalisations & privatisations: the State recapitalised and (later) re-privatised major banks over a decade. The direct cost of bank rescues (variously reported) was large (official figures cited ~€62.8bn in recapitalisation costs, with additional macro costs and the IMF/EU programme). Over the 2010s–2020s the State gradually sold its stakes (e.g., AIB privatisation moves in the early 2020s), recovering some value — but the fiscal scars were real. 

6) The recent picture (2023 → Oct 2025): supply shortage + high migration = renewed price pressure

House prices and transactions:

By 2024–2025 prices and rents were rising again; Daft.ie reported sharp falls in listed supply (nationally very low numbers of second-hand houses for sale) and consistent year-on-year price/rent inflation in most urban areas. Reuters and other outlets flagged big rises in transaction prices since the low-supply era began after 2013 (some reporting cumulative rises of 100%+ in parts of the market since 2013—note: exact % varies by source and timeframe). 

Construction/completions:

Output has improved from its post-crash nadir but remains below the level needed: construction reached roughly the low-to-mid 30,000s for completions in recent years (2023–2024), short of the Central Bank’s 52,000 p.a. estimate of what would be needed over the medium term to keep up with population and household formation trends. There was a surprising jump in Q2 2025 where new home building rose 35% year-on-year for that quarter (a positive sign), but annual totals still risk missing long-term targets because pipeline, planning, serviced land and financing constraints persist. 

Supply-side frictions (why builders aren’t simply fixing it):

Planning delays / infrastructure lag, land servicing, cost inflation in construction, fragmented developer finance, risk/return for institutional builders, regulatory changes (including apartment rules) and a loss of smaller private landlords all raise the cost and complexity of ramping up supply quickly. Banks also complain there’s insufficient viable pipeline of projects to deploy housing development funds at scale. These are structural constraints, not simply a short blip. 

Migration / demand shock:

Ireland’s net migration surged after the pandemic. CSO figures show net migration of 79,300 in the year to April 2024 (125,300 immigrants, 65,600 emigrants), up from 51,700 in 2022 — among the highest net flows in recent decades and a major driver of housing demand. Even if net migration cools, the level of annual inflows has materially increased household formation needs compared with the pre-2015 period. That tidal wave of people is an obvious demand shock to a market with constrained supply. 

7) Putting the pieces together — why prices are high again

1. Legacy shortfall in supply: construction never fully replaced the homes lost to under-building after 2008. Output in the 2010s was far below what would have been needed to match population and household trends. Central Bank estimates of required annual builds (52k) demonstrate the gap. 

2. Large positive net migration: tens of thousands of people arriving each year since 2022/23 substantially raised demand for housing (CSO). Short term supply response is slow. 

3. Planner and finance bottlenecks: developers, institutional builders, and banks cite planning delays, land servicing, and a shallow pipeline of viable projects — these make quick scale-up expensive and risky. 

4. Residual effects from the crash: banking consolidation, changed investor behaviour, and risk aversion among smaller landlords (many of whom exited the rental market) mean the private rental stock has shrunk in parts of the country — that feeds rent and price pressure. 

8) The political and policy angle

The State’s response after the crash (NAMA, bank recapitalisation, EU/IMF support) stabilised the system but produced high public debt and constrained public fiscal space for years. Policy since has tried to accelerate planning reforms, subsidised building and boost supply, but implementation is slow and politically fraught (local resistance, infrastructure costs, design rules, etc.). Central Bank and independent economists repeatedly emphasise that supply is the binding constraint; but delivering the kind of supply increase needed will require simultaneous action on planning, land, finance, construction methods and incentives. 

9) Key numbers

  • Peak average price (2007): ~€349,838. 
  • Trough (2012): ~€205,476. 
  • Estimated bank recap costs (commonly cited): ~€62.8 billion (officially reported figure for bank losses/recapitalisations). 
  • NAMA acquisition nominal value: ~€71–74 billion (loans); NAMA paid far less via securities. 
  • Central Bank suggested build rate to meet demand: ~52,000 homes/year (estimate to meet long-run demand). 
  • Net migration (year to Apr 2024): +79,300 (125,300 in; 65,600 out). 

10) Final assessment — the realistic take

The housing shortage is structural, not cyclical. Short-term boosts to completions can help (Q2 2025 showed a spike), but without sustained changes — more serviced land, faster planning, cheaper/safer finance for large builders, modern construction methods, and political will to put infrastructure where homes are needed — prices will keep outpacing incomes in many urban areas. Expect volatility: policy tweaks, interest-rate moves and temporary supply bumps will produce short-term easing at times, but the core mismatch (large inward migration + too few homes permitted and built) remains the dominant driver. 


You can listen to a podcast on this topic here.

There is also a short video available here.